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The Reichstag Fire Trial, 1933–2008 
The Production of Law and History
M i c h a e l  e .  T i g a r  and  J o h n  M a g e
In the opening decade of the twentieth century the German national 
state united the great majority of the German speaking population of 
Europe, excluding only those in Switzerland and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and was among the leading states of the world. It boasted tech-
nologically advanced industry, among the highest per capita GDP, and 
the second largest army and third largest navy in the world. Germany 
was at peace, save for minor military operations against disobedient na-
tives in Southwest Africa. It was a state that was among world leaders 
in providing basic social insurance, yet held sacred private property and 
the rule of law, except only in strictly prescribed areas of national secu-
rity. In the opening decade of the twentieth-first century the German 
national state unites the great majority of the German speaking popula-
tion of Europe, excepting only those in Switzerland and Austria, its in-
dustry is technologically advanced and its per capita GDP high. Its mili-
tary budget is the sixth largest in the world, and it is at peace, save for 
minor military operations against disobedient natives in Afghanistan. 
Despite cutbacks, few states in the world have better provision of basic 
social insurance, and Germany today prides itself on holding private 
property to be sacred and on its adherence to the rule of law, except for 
a few strictly prescribed areas of national security. In the fourth and fifth 
decades of the twentieth century the German national state committed 
crimes universally agreed to be the most horrendous in human history.
Causal explanations of the descent into the Nazi hell have been, of 
course, numerous. Some have emphasized ideas, as in the Isaiah Berlin 
thesis that traces a line of descent into Nazi barbarism starting with the 
rejection of enlightenment values in the German romantic nationalism 
of the early nineteenth century. Other explanations, which we prefer, 
emphasize the interests and actions of those who held the most pow-
er—the ruling class—in the society that produced the Third Reich. But 
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what of the formidable German legal establishment, the Bar, the judi-
ciary, and the globally esteemed jurists, those much honored theorists 
in their university chairs? While no sensible case can be made that gives 
any primary causal responsibility to the legal establishment, yet it is 
very clear that it (or if you prefer “the Law”) presented not the slightest 
obstacle. Nonetheless the German legal establishment was not irrele-
vant, it had a secondary but not unimportant role in the debacle. For 
the Nazis to lead the German nation into a war of aggression and into 
genocide required their hegemony, the tacit acceptance of the legitimacy 
of their acts—and of the dutiful observance to their demands—as the 
lawful rulers of the German state, even by many of those German citi-
zens who disagreed with their policies. Resistance to the Nazis, how-
ever, required the quickest possible global recognition of their crimes 
and the threat they represented to all decent people in the entire world. 
For one moment in the early days of Nazi rule in Germany a public 
trial presented a focus in which the German courts provided the Nazis 
an opportunity to further their hegemony, and the potential to the 
global resistance of an opportunity to expose the Nazi crimes—the 
Reichstag Fire trial.
The nazis aim for Power in Defeated germany: The reichstag Fire 
When the German Empire, a constitutional federal state dominated 
by the Kingdom of Prussia, went to war in the first days of August 1914, 
it did so with a near consensus of its citizenry that the cause of the war 
was the prior hostile mobilization of the immense army of the Russian 
Empire. The war was defensive, and whatever measures needed to pre-
serve the nation from invasion by the tsarist hordes must immediately 
be taken, or so it was argued by almost every public voice from anti-
Semites and Conservative Nationalists on the right to the majority of 
the Social Democrats on the left. 
The Reichstag, the national parliament elected by universal man-
hood suffrage, voted not only the necessary funds (unanimously) but a 
series of war laws and decrees, in particular the first Enabling Act of 
August 4, 1914, that affected a range of basic rights by authorizing the 
government to impose “protective custody” and to curtail freedom of 
assembly, freedom of the press, and postal privacy.
With defeat came a regime headed by majority Social Democrats 
who had actively helped to pursue the war, and were cursed from the 
start by their complicity with extreme right-wing nationalists in the 
January 1919 murder of the left Socialist leaders Rosa Luxemburg and 
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Karl Liebknecht. This government was compelled to sign the Versailles 
treaty, including harshly punitive measures against Germany based 
upon the assertion of war guilt; a question nonetheless still very much 
open ninety years later. 
The new regime’s Weimar Constitution preserved federalism (police 
powers being entrusted to the states) including the leading role of 
Prussia, but replaced the Kaiser with an elected president, whose pow-
ers included the ability to declare a state of emergency and to rule by 
decree. While political party governments came and went, including 
some headed by Social Democrats, Weimar Germany continued in prac-
tice to be administered by the prior ruling strata of conservative nation-
alist owners of considerable wealth and, frequently, large landed es-
tates, who almost without exception dominated the top ranks of the 
permanent civil service, the army, the judiciary, and large industry. The 
only position of real state power held by the Social Democrats was their 
control of the police in the dominant state of Prussia, albeit a control in 
practice used heavily against the Communist-led left workers move-
ment. The Prussian police were the police of the capital Berlin, and 
constituted over 60 percent of all the police in Germany.
When the Great Depression hit Germany in 1929–30, government by 
parliamentary majority collapsed and a series of inconclusive elections 
followed. President von Hindenburg authorized the government of 
Chancellor Bruening to rule by decree, enforcing a series of harsh eco-
nomic measures in a time of widespread distress. 
The Nazis, a lineal descendent of the right-wing nationalists who 
had murdered Luxemburg and Liebknecht, and who had received a 
vote of 3 to 6 percent in the elections of the 1920s, now emerged as a 
major political force, winning nearly 20 percent of the vote in the June 
1930 elections and approximately a third of the vote in the two 1932 
Reichstag elections. In the summer of 1932 von Hindenburg appointed 
as chancellor von Papen, a minor right-wing politician. Von Papen on 
July 20, 1932, urged on by the Nazis in the Prussian legislature, seized 
control of the police power in Prussia from the Social Democrats as 
Reich Commissioner for Prussia under an emergency decree signed by 
von Hindenburg.
After two succeeding inconclusive elections and after von Papen was 
replaced as chancellor by Schleicher, the aged President von Hindenburg 
was persuaded by his son Oskar and by von Papen to make Hitler chan-
cellor, on January 30, 1933. Hitler had persuaded von Hindenburg by 
insisting on only two positions in the cabinet for Nazis; Frick as inte-
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rior minister and Goering—Nazi president of the Reichstag—as minis-
ter without portfolio, but as minister of the interior of Prussia, with 
control of the Prussian police. 
The new cabinet obtained from the compliant President a decree 
dissolving the Reichstag, and calling new elections for March 5, 1933. 
Goering also obtained a decree that had been prepared by von Papen 
but never issued, giving the new ministry emergency powers to combat 
“acts of terrorism” by the Communists. This Decree for the Protection 
of the German People included the power to censor the press, ban pub-
lic meetings, and impose “protective custody” for up to three months 
on suspicion of planned criminal activity, and was promulgated by 
President von Hindenburg on February 4. 
Goering set to work to take full control of the Prussian interior min-
istry and police. The political division of the police was reorganized, 
and given the name Geheime Statspolizei, the Secret State Police or 
Gestapo, and placed under Goering’s direct control. As a clear sign of 
the new coalition in power, the new head of the Prussian police was Dr. 
Ludwig Grauert, previously business manager of the heavy industry 
employers association. Police chiefs and key officials were replaced 
throughout Prussia, primarily by Nazis. Goering gave a widely reported 
speech to police in Dortmund that made things as clear as could be: “A 
bullet fired from the barrel of a police pistol is my bullet. If you say that 
is murder, then I am the murderer....I know two sorts of law because I 
know two sorts of men: those who are with us and those who are 
against us.”
On February 22, fifty thousand Nazi SA men (Storm Troopers) 
throughout Prussia were enrolled as auxiliary police. On February 24 
Goering’s police raided Communist headquarters, and announced 
(falsely) that seditious literature had been found calling for an armed 
revolution and attacks on public buildings; everything was ready.
The Reichstag building broke into flames on the night of February 27, 
1933. Immediately mass arrests were carried out using carefully pre-
pared lists of Communist leaders and Reichstag deputies, as well as 
various Social Democrats, leading left-wing intellectuals, and trade 
union leaders. In the first night some four thousand were seized, 
brought to SA barracks, beaten, and tortured. Goering announced that 
the Reichstag Fire was to have been the signal for an insurrection and 
terrorist acts throughout Germany. On February 28 the Decree for the 
Protection of People and State Against Communist Acts of Violence 
Endangering the State was promulgated over the signature of von 
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Hindenburg. The first article removed all fundamental rights specified 
in the Weimar constitution, specifically listing personal liberty, free-
dom of expression, association, and assembly, and the need for war-
rants for house searches. The second article gave the national govern-
ment the right to remove all the state governments. Another article 
provided the death penalty for violation of the offenses set out in the 
decree, and for arson. Nonetheless the Nazis failed to gain a majority in 
the Reichstag in the March 5 elections; indeed, in their last vote the 
German people elected eighty-one Communist deputies. But at the first 
meeting of the newly elected Reichstag the Nazis achieved a majority 
when the eighty-one Communist deputies, many in detention since the 
Reichstag Fire, were expelled. On March 23 this Reichstag passed an 
Enabling Act, entitled Act for the Removal of Distress from People and 
Reich, that gave Hitler absolute power to rule.
The Reichstag Fire led to a dramatic trial, and to an equally conse-
quential counter-trial. Media attention to the trial and the political 
currents around it—and its leading personalities—occupied world at-
tention. This was the political trial of its time. In this article, we discuss 
the political setting of the fire, the trial and surrounding events, and the 
lessons that may be drawn from the changing historical accounts of the 
trial. We examine critically the different versions of key events. 
Three reichstag Fire Proceedings
There were three Reichstag “proceedings” of consequence. Under 
German law, the first judicial phase was a preliminary examination of 
evidence, with the object of compiling a dossier and bringing formal 
charges. This phase was under the control of Judge Paul Vogt, a loyal 
Nazi who ordered the potential defendants held in prison, most of the 
time in chains—contrary to German law as it then existed. This pro-
ceeding began in March 1933 and ended on August 31, 1933, when Vogt 
filed thirty-two volumes of transcripts and documents. Those charged 
were the Dutch anarchist Marinus van der Lubbe, who had been ar-
rested at the fire scene, Ernst Torgler, leader of the Communist Party 
group in the Reichstag, and three Bulgarian Communists who were so-
journing in Berlin—Georgi Dimitrov, Simon Popov, and Vassili Tanev. 
The second proceeding was a series of hearings held in London by a 
Legal Commission of Inquiry into the Burning of the Reichstag. Their 
work was designed to focus attention on the events in Germany and to 
assemble evidence, including evidence likely to be excluded from the 
German proceeding such as that tending to exculpate the defendants or 
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implicate the Nazis. The commission reported on September 20, 1933, 
concluding that there was no evidence linking Torgler, Dimitrov, Popov, 
and Tanev to the fire, that van der Lubbe could not have acted alone, 
and that there was significant evidence that the Nazis had themselves 
set the Reichstag on fire. The commission’s work was part of an inter-
national protest movement, focused not solely upon the pending and 
impending judicial proceedings in Germany, but also upon the National 
Socialist seizure of power using the fire as a pretext. The commission 
had the benefit of an extensive investigation conducted by the World 
Committee for the Relief of the Victims of German Fascism, which as-
sembled physical evidence and found witnesses. 
The third proceeding: on September 21, 1933, the criminal trial 
opened in Leipzig. On October 10 the proceedings moved to Berlin to 
observe the Reichstag premises and later returned to Leipzig. Presiding 
Judge Buenger pronounced the verdict on December 23. 
In the pretrial, commission, and trial proceedings, the Nazis and 
the defendants sought to tell very different stories. Hitler, Goering, 
and Goebbels had announced the Nazis’ theory on the night of the fire: 
Communists were guilty; van der Lubbe, who was arrested at the 
scene, was one of their agents. A decree promulgated on February 28, 
the day after the fire, enlarged the definition of treason to include 
many forms of dissent—including any claim that the Nazis had set the 
fire. Nazi officials declared that such measures were proved necessary 
by a thorough investigation that showed the guilt of unnamed 
“Communists.” After the Second World War, Goering admitted that 
no such investigation had taken place, but that Hitler had insisted on 
the decree being issued. 
The night of February 27, Ernst Torgler was arrested when he went 
voluntarily to the police station when he heard his name on the radio. 
The three Bulgarians were rounded up on March 9. 
The Nazi officials now faced the problem of proving their claims. 
They decided to hold a public trial that would have some surface ap-
pearance, but only that, of fairness. On March 3, 1933, Goering told the 
Cabinet that the preliminary examination would soon begin. The exam-
ining magistrate was Dr. Braune, “who used to investigate charges 
against the National Socialist Party, and who has always been most ruth-
less with us. Even if he did his work objectively, he is hardly the right 
man to handle so important a case. Thus he might restrict his investiga-
tions to the criminal alone....He might even set Deputy Torgler free.” 
Hitler concurred. Thus, Judge Vogt was chosen to replace Braune. To 
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prevent any future uncertainties about the political persuasion of judges 
and lawyers, the Nazi-controlled Reichstag set up “Special Courts” on 
March 21, 1933, to try offenses listed in the February 28 Reichstag Fire 
decree. On April 24, 1934, the Reichstag authorized “People’s Courts” to 
replace the former trial courts in political cases. In the new judicial sys-
tem, all of the judges would be loyal Nazis and defense counsel would 
show their loyalty to the regime by making speeches against their cli-
ents. Only one of these measures was applied retroactively to the 
Reichstag Fire defendants: a March 29 law authorized a death sentence 
for certain crimes committed between January 1 and February 28. 
Vogt set to work with enthusiasm. He sent word to police officials 
all over Germany, asking for information on suspected Communist acts 
of sabotage and terrorism. He focused his attention on witnesses re-
cruited by the police. He did not explore the contradictions and lacu-
nae in the various forensic reports about the fire. 
While Vogt did his work, antifascist activists in several countries 
began a counter-offensive. The World Committee for the Relief of the 
Victims of German Fascism was established with branches in the 
United States and several European countries. Communist Party activ-
ists had a great deal to do with organizing the committees, but the 
membership represented a cross-section of influential figures. On 
August 1, a book, the Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the 
Reichstag appeared under the committee’s name. The Brown Book was 
translated into many languages and millions of copies were sold, in-
cluding in major department stores in the United States. It contained, 
according to Arthur Koestler, “the first comprehensive report on the 
concentration camps...the persecution of Jews [and others], the repres-
sion of literature, and other aspects of the terror.” The Brown Book con-
tained an impressive array of evidence that Torgler, Dimitrov, Popov, 
and Tanev were innocent, and that the Nazis had set the fire. 
The committee recruited a staff of investigators and forensic experts, 
who collected evidence in Germany and in Holland, where van der 
Lubbe had lived. After this preparatory work, the Commission of 
Inquiry held its proceedings in London in September 1933. The commis-
sion was chaired by renowned British barrister D. N. Pritt, K.C, a 
prominent member of the Labour Party, and included American lawyer 
and ACLU founder Arthur Garfield Hays, celebrated French advocate 
Vincent de Moro-Giaferri, former Italian prime minister Francesco 
Nitti, and Swedish senator Georg Branting. The commission proceed-
ings were formal and fairly rigorous. It heard lengthy and detailed evi-
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dence about the fire and the Nazi reaction to it. The commission, as a 
result of the reputation of its members and the care taken in its pro-
ceedings, achieved favorable attention in the global press. Its report 
even made its way—illegally—into Germany, and at times became the 
text against which the Nazis focused their efforts at trial. Torgler’s law-
yer, Dr. Sack, spent more than half of his closing speech criticizing in 
detail the commission’s report before he began to deal with the case 
against his client.
Who Set the reichstag on Fire?
We begin by examining the evidence. Then, we can examine the 
trial proceedings. 
The night of the fire, German police arrested van der Lubbe, half 
clothed. He had removed his shirt to use it as kindling while setting one 
of the fires inside the Reichstag. 
Many characterizations of van der Lubbe’s role in the Reichstag Fire 
have begun by characterizing his political and social outlook and even 
in some cases his alleged sexual orientation. From these premises, often 
based on scant evidence, writers leap to a conclusion that van der 
Lubbe acted alone, or acted with Communists or Nazis depending on 
one’s perspective. In 1933, writers of the left and right sprinkled their 
prose with this sort of conclusion-jumping. 
 The preferable, and more reliable, way to see van der Lubbe’s role 
is to reason from the undisputed forensic evidence, introduced in evi-
dence in London or at the German trial, and the contemporaneous re-
ports of journalists and police officers at the scene. Then, one can 
evaluate the divergent views presented in the dozens of books and ar-
ticles about the fire. 
By the time police arrived and arrested van der Lubbe, about 9:30 
p.m., on the 27th, the Reichstag was ablaze. Many separate fires were 
merging into one. Indeed, the fire was not put out until nearly mid-
night. A British newspaper journalist arrived about 9:45, even before 
Hitler, Goebbels, and Goering, and reported that a police officer said, 
“They’ve got one of them who did it, a man with nothing but his trou-
sers on. He seems to have used his coat and shirt to start the fire. But 
there must be others still inside. They’re looking for them there.” 
When Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels arrived, they quickly began to 
assert—without a particle of evidence—that the Communists must 
have set the fire, and to announce that they would immediately begin a 
meeting to decide on repressive measures. 
3 2  M o n T h l Y  r e V i e W  /  M a r c h  2 0 0 9
According to the prosecution’s trial evidence, van der Lubbe en-
tered the Reichstag by breaking a window on the lower level. A wit-
ness named Floeter was passing on his bicycle and heard the sound of 
breaking glass. He stopped to look and saw someone on the first floor 
balcony with a burning object in his hand. He told a police officer, 
Buwert, what he had seen, and continued on his way. Another witness, 
Thaler, stopped because he also heard the sound of breaking glass. 
Thaler originally reported seeing two men inside the building. 
Thus, the timeline of the fire begins at 9:03 or a little after, when the 
witnesses seem to agree that there was the sound of glass breaking and 
one or more people were inside the building setting fires. Another 
important person in this recital is House-Inspector Scranowitz, who 
rushed from his nearby apartment to the Reichstag, and actually con-
fronted and arrested van der Lubbe about 9:25 or a little before. By that 
time, the Reichstag’s main chambers were in flames. 
Scranowitz later prepared a diagram that identified at least two 
dozen separate places of origin for the fires that were set and later 
merged into one or two large-scale blazes. The indictment alleged 
twenty-three separate fires, in different parts of the building, and on 
different floors. In order to reconcile the known time of the first blaze 
being set, at 9:03, and the later progress of the fires, the prosecution 
accepted that all these fires must have been set within about eleven to 
fourteen minutes. 
Moreover, the prosecution forensic experts also agreed that an ac-
celerant or accelerants were used to set the fires, although they dis-
agreed on whether the material was liquid or solid. That night, when 
the alarm was given and officials began to arrive at the Reichstag, they 
found all exterior doors were locked, as they should have been. 
There was never any plausible evidence against Dimitrov, Tanev, 
and Popov. Torgler, who was a Reichstag deputy, did come and go from 
the building on a regular basis, but he had a solid alibi for the time 
when the fire was set. No forensic evidence or credible witness state-
ment linked him to the fire. 
Van der Lubbe was caught at the scene. He had doubtless been in-
volved. As we have noted, the Brown Book marshaled the evidence that 
the Nazis set the fire. Their research showed that there was an under-
ground passage leading into the Reichstag. This passage had three 
entrances: the one in the Reichstag, one in the Reichstag president’s—
Goering’s—residence, and one in what the contemporary record de-
scribes as an “engine house” or machinery room. 
T h e  r e i c h S T a g  F i r e  T r i a l  3 3
At the trial, Dimitrov attempted to inquire whether the under-
ground passage had been investigated, using information that the com-
mission had collected. He was initially ruled out of order. However, a 
prosecution witness named Adermann testified that he had heard 
noises from the passage during nights before the fire. The issue was 
then open for discussion. The court visited the site and heard evidence 
about the passage. 
It turned out that at least one set of keys to the passage doors was 
kept by Inspector Scranowitz, the man who had arrested van der 
Lubbe at about 9:25. When the fire was discovered, someone on duty 
called Scranowitz, who did not answer his telephone. Scranowitz 
turned up at the fire scene about 9:18 and told an SS officer that he had 
heard people in the cellars of the Reichstag. The Commission of 
Inquiry concluded that the underground passage was the probable 
entry point for those who set the fire. Not surprisingly, the prosecution 
and the German court rejected this idea. 
Late in the evening of February 27, Martin Sommerfeldt, who was 
Goering’s press chief, appeared at the Reichstag and interviewed po-
lice and firefighters in order to prepare a press communiqué. He 
drafted a press communiqué reporting that the police had collected 
“about a hundredweight” of firelighters—about fifty kilograms—at the 
scene. Sommefeldt met with Goering, who drafted a press release say-
ing that the recovered incendiary material was so heavy that at least 
seven persons would have been necessary to carry it, and that the fires 
had to have been set by persons familiar with the Reichstag building. 
Goering’s memo, which was issued to the press, said that at least ten 
persons must have been involved in setting the fire. 
The most reliable studies of the fire focus on this forensic evidence, 
which tends powerfully to show that van der Lubbe could not have acted 
alone and that the probable method of entry into the Reichstag was the 
underground passage—the exterior doors having been found locked. 
Elements of the left sprang to van der Lubbe’s defense—at least 
against the charge of having been complicit with the Nazis. In 1933 and 
early 1934, an anarchist group called Comité mondiale contre la guerre 
et le fascisme (the World Committee Against War and Fascism) pub-
lished a number of tracts defending van der Lubbe from charges made 
against him in the Brown Book. This group had adherents in France, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. Its main theme was that van der Lubbe was a 
faithful adherent of the working-class movement, and that his act was 
“perfectly legitimate...individual and consequential.” It labeled the 
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Brown Book accusation that van der Lubbe was a tool of the Nazis “petty 
bourgeois and Stalinist.” This view of van der Lubbe has been carried 
forward into recent times.
Three Trials,  Five Defendants
At trial, the court and prosecution divided the evidence into three 
parts. First, the court heard evidence about the five defendants’ back-
grounds and activities before the fire. Second, the court—having moved 
the proceedings to Berlin—heard testimony about the fire itself and the 
events immediately surrounding it. The third phase was avowedly po-
litical, focusing on the defendants’ alleged propensities and on the Nazi 
officials’ denial that the Nazis had set the fire. 
Arthur Garfield Hays attended most of the trial, and noted the dif-
ferences between the U.S. trial procedure to which he was accustomed 
and what he saw in Germany. In the trial chamber, six judges sat in red 
robes with skullcaps, with Judge Buenger presiding. On the other side 
of this dais sat the prosecutors, also on a raised platform. On the right 
sat the defendants, inside a railed enclosure. Their counsel sat near 
them. Guards sat near the defendants. 
German trial procedure at that time followed the continental, civil 
law, model. The preliminary examination, and the thirty-two volumes of 
reports it generated, were to be the principal basis of the trial. Lawyers 
did not make opening statements. Witness statements might be received 
based on the written preliminary examination record. Or, a witness 
might be called to testify on one point, then excused and recalled later 
when a different subject was being considered. The judges might halt a 
witness’s testimony to call a contradictory witness then and there. If 
more than one person claimed to have observed a relevant event, several 
witnesses might all be called at once, and questioned by the judges in a 
group until the judges felt some resolution had been reached. Judge 
Buenger dominated the witness questioning, based upon the preliminary 
examination report. From time to time, the prosecutor and the judges 
might confer as to where some item might be found in the record. 
Continental procedure permits hearsay testimony: A witness may 
recount what somebody else told him or her, or what he or she over-
heard being said. The hearsay may be discounted, in preference to the 
witness’s personal knowledge, but it nonetheless comes in. 
This procedure makes it difficult for a defense lawyer to seize the 
initiative and try to turn the proceedings to his or her advantage. As 
Hays wrote, 
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Compared to our system, the lawyers play a minor part in a criminal 
trial. The defendants play a much greater part. In Germany, after the 
judge makes his inquiry, lawyers for the defendant are asked if they want 
to put questions. Then the defendants themselves are given the oppor-
tunity. In this trial Dimitrov never failed to avail himself of this right. He 
told the court that he wanted neither “the honey nor the poison” of 
Teichert’s [his appointed counsel] defense. He intended to defend not 
only himself, but the Communist Party. “That’s what I’m here for.”
As a matter of evidence, Dimitrov, Popov, and Tanev had solid alibis, 
and the witnesses whose testimony put them in a position to have com-
mitted the crime were shown either to have been coached into making 
misleading statements or were criminals terrified of Nazi retribution, 
and incredible. Torgler, as a Reichstag deputy, had access to the building 
but was demonstrably nowhere near it when the fire was set. 
Van der Lubbe’s counsel, Dr. Seuffert, could not play much of a role. 
His client had confessed under interrogation. Throughout the trial van 
der Lubbe sat slumped in his chair, Hays describing him as having “the 
look of an ox,” who “would seem to shrink into a green lump.” Dr. 
Seuffert would from time to time wipe the drool from his client’s face. 
The state’s efforts to tie van der Lubbe to the Communist movement 
were weak. He was said to have possessed a red membership card, but 
the membership cards of the German Communist Party were black, and 
of the Dutch party blue-black. National Socialist cards were red. 
Van der Lubbe’s answers, when the court called him as a witness, 
were mostly monosyllabic and often incoherent; he agreed hesitantly to 
the leading questions put to him about his actions and his confession to 
the police, though at times he became noncommittal as though he could 
not remember what he had done and said. 
There was one point, however, at which van der Lubbe came awake. 
Count Wolf von Helldorf, a Storm Trooper leader and Berlin police of-
ficial, appeared as a witness on October 20, 1933. He had investigated the 
fire. The Brown Book had accused him of complicity in setting it. He was 
asked to look at the defendants to see if he recognized any of them, or 
they him. Van der Lubbe would not raise his head, even after Judge 
Buenger prompted him. Von Helldorf barked a command: “You, put your 
head up. Quick!” Van der Lubbe quickly obeyed. As the left press noted, 
it appeared that he had heard his master’s voice. 
The Nazi leaders and the Bulgarian defendants agreed on one point: 
This was a political trial. Any effective defense had to acknowledge this 
fact and confront the reality of Nazi power and influence. Dimitrov’s 
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tactics, from the first witness until the last words of argument at the 
end, were based on knowing this truth. In all the histories of the trial, 
his performance stands out. Why do we say the trial was political? First, 
four of the defendants were chosen based on their membership in the 
Communist Party, and not on the basis of credible evidence. The Nazi 
theme, that “the Communists did it,” was a trial theme. Indeed, in ac-
quitting Torgler, Dimitrov, Popov, and Tanev, Judge Buerger nonetheless 
“found” that the fire was part of a Communist plot. Second, in the trial 
proceedings the Nazis took up the Brown Book challenge. The prosecution 
aimed to discredit the Brown Book theory, to such an extent that the book 
was said to be the sixth defendant. The Nazis had decided to make their 
case not only to the court but to the German population and the foreign 
press. Leading Nazi figures came to the trial to express their views. 
Dimitrov did not “politicize” the trial. He showed up and dealt with 
what he found. 
From the first trial day, Dimitrov set out to dominate the proceed-
ings. He cross-examined almost every witness who mentioned his name 
or those of his compatriots. He usually began with “I ask the witness to 
which party he belongs.” The answer, more often than not, was “to the 
parties of the right.” Judge Buenger would ask the purpose of the ques-
tion. Dimitrov would say some variation of “I want to know who paid 
for this witness.” Judge Buenger would often admonish, “This is an in-
sult to the witness.” After a further exchange, the judge would cut off 
Dimitrov’s questioning. 
When Dimitrov testified, he insisted on making a statement of his 
innocence, rather than beginning by responding to questions. He set 
out his defense: He had not been in Berlin, did not know Torgler and 
van der Lubbe, and was in Germany on behalf of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party. Under questioning, Dimitrov responded emphati-
cally and always with a challenge to the unfairness of the proceedings. 
From time to time, Judge Buenger would reprimand him or exclude him 
from the court for a day or so. When Dimitrov claimed that a map of 
Berlin, allegedly found in his rooms, had been forged, the judge said, “I 
won’t permit you to insult the police.” When Dimitrov suggested that 
the Nazis had set the fire, the judge said: “Dimitrov...behave modestly 
and quietly. If you can’t do that, you won’t get very far here.” Dimitrov 
replied, “I feel compelled to speak. I don’t deny my Communist convic-
tions. But because of that I am opposed to individual terror. During the 
investigation, the judge [Vogt] tried to make a terroristic adventurer out 
of me.” Judge Buenger told Dimitrov to raise that issue with his coun-
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sel, to which the latter replied, “I have already said I do not recognize 
this counsel. I am my own counsel.”
And indeed he was. The most celebrated events of the trial were ap-
pearances by Storm Troop leaders and police officials Heines and von 
Helldorf, as well as Goering and Goebbels. The chief prosecutor, Dr. 
Werner, explained that the Brown Book had claimed that Goering and 
Goebbels were instigators of the fire, and they should be “given the op-
portunity of clearing their names.”
Goering was summoned to appear on November 4. Security around 
the courthouse was enhanced. Government officials were in attendance. 
At 10:30, after keeping the court waiting for an hour, Goering entered in 
his Storm Trooper uniform. All the Germans gave the Hitler salute. Dr. 
Buenger echoed Dr. Werner’s sentiment that Goering and Goebbels 
should be permitted to rebut the Brown Book allegations. 
Goering then spoke for three hours, with noisy support from the 
audience. 
After Goering’s statement, Dimitrov cross-examined. He peppered 
Goering with questions. He put questions designed to show that 
Goering’s accusations of Communist complicity were made after a cur-
sory and flawed investigation. Goering’s anger mounted. He said he was 
“only concerned with the Communist Party of Germany and with the 
foreign Communist crooks who come here to set the Reichstag on fire.” 
The audience cheered. Dimitrov replied, “Yes, of course, bravo, bravo, 
bravo! They have the right to fight against the Communist Party, but the 
Communist Party of Germany has the right to go underground and to 
fight against your government; and how we fight back is a matter of our 
respective forces and not a matter of law.” Judge Buenger interjected: 
“Dimitrov, I will not have you making Communist propaganda here.” To 
which Dimitrov replied that Goering was making National Socialist pro-
paganda. The exchange continued: 
Goering: Look here, I will tell you what the German people know. They 
know you are behaving in a disgraceful fashion....I did not come here to 
be accused by you.
Dimitrov: You are a witness.
Goering: In my eyes you are nothing but a scoundrel, a crook who belongs 
on the gallows.
Dimitrov: Very well, I am most satisfied.
At this point, Judge Buenger cut Dimitrov off, again accusing him of 
making propaganda, while not rebuking Goering at all. Dimitrov tried to 
put more questions, but the judge ordered him to sit down. Dimitrov 
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had one last shot: “You are greatly afraid of my questions, are you not, 
Herr Minister?” Goering’s anger rose. He replied, “You will be afraid 
when I catch you. You wait until I get you out of the power of this Court, 
you crook!” The judge, ever dutiful, said, “Dimitrov is expelled for three 
days. Out with him!”
The moment is without parallel, the witness credibly threatening to 
murder the accused. And the effect of Dimitrov’s cross-examination of 
Goering, in the court and around the world, was electrifying. The next 
day the Swiss conservative paper Neue Zürcher Zeitung described Goering’s 
“mad foolhardy rage” and concluded that “the whole trial has been ren-
dered worthless at one blow.” 
Goebbels’s appearance, four days later, was less dramatic but again 
saw Dimitrov in great form. Dimitrov focused on the inconsistency be-
tween the prosecution’s claim that the Communists had set the fire and 
Goebbels’s earlier accusation that the Social Democrats had also been 
involved. Judge Buenger had apparently learned something from 
Goering’s appearance, for he suggested at several points that Goebbels 
need not answer Dimitrov’s questions that were asked “for propaganda 
purposes.” Goebbels declined the judge’s suggestions. Torgler also ques-
tioned Goebbels, establishing that the German Communists had em-
braced strikes and political discourse rather than violence. In a final 
statement, Goebbels explained that he had come to court because “the 
foreign press has done nothing to remedy” the “lying accusations” of the 
Brown Book. 
At the end of the trial, the judges gave a lengthy opinion analyzing the 
evidence. Van der Lubbe was convicted and sentenced to death, the oth-
ers acquitted. The court concluded:
Even though...the defendants Torgler and the Bulgarians [Dimitrov, Tanev 
and Popov] could not be convicted as accessories, nonetheless no doubt 
exists as to the camp in which these accessories were to be found....The 
burning of the Reichstag was undoubtedly a political act. The enormity 
of the crime—that is to say, of the means—points to the importance and 
violence of the goal. This can only have been the seizure of power....The 
crime can only be the work of radical left-wing elements, who hoped to 
exploit it for the purpose of overthrowing the government and the con-
stitution, and seizing power....The Communist party has proclaimed such 
treasonable goals as its program. It was the party of treason.
What Did This Trial  Prove, and to Whom?
Every famous trial has several audiences. Each side, prosecution 
and defense, is intent on winning if possible. That means gaining the 
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assent of a judge or judges, or of jurors. But sometimes when the court-
room result seems foreordained, and sometimes even when it does not, 
parties understand that there is a wider audience that must be con-
vinced, if possible, where justice is to be found. 
The prosecutors who tried Aaron Burr for treason must have known 
that he would probably be acquitted, yet their proof and their argu-
ments were designed to sully Burr’s reputation beyond repair regard-
less of the trial’s outcome. When John Brown was tried in 1859 for 
leading a slave revolt, murder, and treason against the State of Virginia, 
a guilty verdict and death sentence were inevitable and Brown knew 
it. He raised his voice against slavery and made his trial a symbol of 
abolitionist sentiment.
In the Reichstag Fire trial, the Communist defendants could see 
how the National Socialists had exploited the fire. The Nazis had 
gained a Reichstag majority by expelling the Communist deputies, as 
part of the spate of repressive measures taken just after the fire. The 
defendants had endured confinement in chains during Judge Vogt’s 
preliminary examination. They were being tried in a “regular” court, 
4 0  M o n T h l Y  r e V i e W  /  M a r c h  2 0 0 9
but before a judiciary that had for decades been moving to the right 
under various political influences and events. They could not be con-
fident of acquittal even though there was no proof whatever of their 
guilt. 
However, Dimitrov had the factual support of the investigative 
work that lay behind the Brown Book. He had his eloquence. He could 
anticipate being acquitted. He was in court every day, so he could seek 
to impose his personality and his views upon the proceedings. No 
other trial participant had—and seized—as many opportunities to 
speak as Dimitrov. As Arthur Garfield Hays reports, “Whenever he got 
to his feet, he would by the force of his personality place the court, the 
prosecutors, the German audience, and the Nazis on the defensive.” 
Hays reports that even Judge Buenger began to accord Dimitrov a kind 
of grudging respect. And the German radio, which had begun by 
broadcasting the trial, began not to air Dimitrov’s participation. 
Regardless of his chances at a favorable judicial verdict, Dimitrov 
knew that the world press whose representatives were there, and the 
left movements who were following the trial, needed to hear his mes-
sage. He stood in a lineage that had begun with the Brown Book, contin-
ued with the London Commission of Inquiry, and would be followed 
by publicity efforts that focused on his defense. He could seek, and 
expect, success with the audiences in court and out of court.
The Nazis also took a considered view of their audiences. By ensur-
ing that Judge Vogt would conduct the preliminary examination, they 
maximized their chances of making their theory the centerpiece of the 
trial. Convicting the Bulgarians was always problematic, although 
Torgler’s access to the Reichstag gave them some grounds to think he 
would be convicted. But a prosecution verdict was never the principal 
object. Nonetheless, the Nazi press and even Hitler himself derided 
the verdict, and it set the stage for the changes in German criminal 
procedure that wiped away all vestiges of due process. The German 
populace heard a very different version of trial events than did those 
who read the international press. The crowd’s reaction to Goering and 
Goebbels was symptomatic. The Nazi political and propaganda ma-
chine was geared to make the entire Reichstag process—from the fire 
to the trial and beyond—an ingredient of its consolidation of power. 
For those property-owning, anticommunist Good Germans to whom 
the Nazis were distasteful, the Reichstag Fire and trial provided reas-
surance that the brutal measures so far taken were in some sense both 
necessary and “legal.” And the legitimacy thus gained contributed to 
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the ready obedience of the Good Germans to the Nazi orders that were 
to come. And every step of the way the German judiciary efficiently 
fulfilled its role and legitimated the Nazi regime, to the bitter end. Of 
the entire German judiciary, after the Jewish and (few) Social 
Democratic judges had been removed in 1933, only one judge resigned 
in protest during the entire course of the Third Reich. 
The Variable history of the reichstag Fire Trial 
 It has often been observed that the past is uncertain, since we do 
not yet know the descriptions of past events by future historians. The 
Reichstag Fire trial provides a clear instance. At the time the verdict 
was accepted outside Germany by those not unsympathetic to the 
Nazis, but for those who saw fascism for what it was, the results of 
the London proceedings and the guilt of the Nazis were taken for 
granted. 
By the time of the Nuremberg tribunal of 1945–46, there was no 
longer any disagreement other than from Goering himself, who at 
Nuremberg continued to deny responsibility. The authoritative ac-
count became that of Hans Bernd Gisevius, who as a young lawyer was 
assigned to the newly formed Gestapo in 1933 as a protégé of Grauert, 
the industrialists’ nominee as head of Goering’s Prussian police. 
Gisevius during the war served in the German counter-intelligence, 
but became a double agent for the Allies. In the fall of 1933 the Gestapo 
assigned him to the Reichstag Fire trial as an “observer.” 
According to Gisevius, a ten-member SA detachment equipped with 
highly inflammable liquid had set fire to the Reichstag. The unit was 
commanded by Storm Leader Heini Gewehr and was under the direct 
orders of Karl Ernst, SA commander in Berlin. They entered the 
Reichstag by the underground tunnels leading from the residence of the 
Reichstag president, Goering. Gisevius and his Gestapo superior Nebe 
came to know the details through the threat by a member of the unit, 
Rall, to make a public statement; Rall was thereafter quickly murdered 
by the SA. Rall’s account comported with the facts developed at the 
trial. Van der Lubbe, a dupe, had been in SA control for several days and 
brought by them to the Reichstag.
 Gisevius, personally an extreme anticommunist, had been without 
doubt in a position to come to know what he alleged, and he became a 
leading Allied witness at the Nuremberg trials. Further confirmation 
came in the form of the Nuremberg trial deposition of Colonel-General 
Franz Halder, chief of the German General Staff from 1938 to 1942, pres-
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ent at a dinner on Hitler’s birthday in 1942 where Goering openly 
boasted of being responsible for the Reichstag Fire. Even in the changed 
circumstances of 1956, the height of the Cold War, Halder insisted in a 
letter published in the Bonn Das Parlament on what he had heard: “I was 
sitting practically next to Hitler, and Goering sat on his right hand....
Every word was clear and distinctly audible.” The Gisevius account 
remained unchallenged, until Cold War events necessitated a West 
German attempt at exculpation of the Nazis. 
The “denazification” of German administration began with the oc-
cupation of Germany in 1945, but came to an end in West Germany with 
the start of the Cold War in 1947–48. At first the process was turned 
over to the West German judiciary, but as the judiciary itself was al-
most completely composed of those who had served the Third Reich, 
“denazification” came swiftly to a halt. With the intense anticommu-
nism of the early years of the Cold War, the time of the “Berlin block-
ade,” and the Korean War, little attention was paid by the mainstream 
western press to the composition of the new West German government. 
Accusations that the new West German administration and armed 
forces were composed almost entirely of Nazi functionaries were dis-
missed as “communist propaganda.” 
Gradually in the years after the “thaw” that followed on the death of 
Stalin, the rise of Khrushchev, and the end of the Korean War, the truth 
of the allegations could no longer be denied. It was established beyond 
question that Hitler’s loyal servants occupied key places from the top 
of the West German regime on down. West German Chancellor 
Adenauer’s chief of staff, Hans Globke, had played a central role in the 
drafting and enforcement of the infamous Nuremburg Laws and the 
extermination of the German Jews. Of the 160 top officers in the West 
German army in 1961 all but one had been a colonel or general in Hitler’s 
Wehrmacht. In West German university chairs in law there were pro-
fessors who had written vicious articles on the “Jewish problem” in the 
years leading up to its “final solution.” And the West German courts 
were filled with judges who had been Nazis or served them faithfully. 
Judges were discovered who had been convicted as war criminals in 
occupied countries. In one chamber of forty-nine judges, forty had been 
Nazis, some accused of murder. Some cases aroused intense interna-
tional interest. One Dr. Hallbauer, a former Storm Trooper, had been a 
judge in Prague and had sentenced Czechs to death for listening to the 
BBC or trying to escape slave labor. When a Czech survivor of his “jus-
tice” discovered that Dr. Hallbauer was serving as a judge in Hamburg, 
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he brought an action seeking compensation for his injuries. The West 
German courts ruled that Dr. Hallbauer’s sentences had been “juristi-
cally correct.” In 1962 the West German justice ministry prosecuted the 
Association of Victims of Nazis as “anticonstitutional”; the three judges 
assigned to the trial had all been Nazis, and one a Storm Trooper.
The exposure of the omnipresence of those who had been Nazis in 
the West German state apparatus required a response. The facts of 
personal biography could not be denied; at most it was possible to 
obscure them. A major effort was made to exaggerate the minimal 
conservative opposition to the Nazis, and especially the belated July 
1944 conspiracy among a handful of officers that led to an unsuccess-
ful attempt on Hitler’s life. But even with the utmost exaggeration, 
very few could be claimed to have had any connection, however re-
mote, with these isolated affairs. 
The great bulk of German opposition to the Nazis had been from 
leftists, and it was in the government of the communist East German 
state—the German Democratic Republic—that it was easy to find those 
who had fought the fascists arms in hand, and those who truly had been 
opponents of the Nazis. A more promising alternative was to exculpate 
the Nazis—who after all had been staunch anticommunists—and in 
particular the Nazi legal system. A further, and more material, concern 
was the presence of substantial claims from Jewish victims of the Nazis, 
demanding restitution of property they had lost (of course always in 
accordance with legal process of some sort) in the first years after Hitler 
came to power. 
A solution was to assert that the German legal system had continued 
to function—of course unfortunately deprived of the services of its 
Jewish judges—with unimpaired validity, at least (as regards the Jewish 
claimants) until Chancellor Adenauer’s chief of staff Globke’s Nuremberg 
Laws came into effect, several years after the Nazis came to power. A 
revision of the history of the Reichstag Fire trial would well serve as the 
basis for this attempt to rehabilitate the Nazi legal system; after all most 
of the defendants were acquitted, and the court had exculpated the 
Nazis from having set fire to the Reichstag. 
At the time, Rudolf Augstein’s weekly Der Spiegel—modeled on Time 
Magazine—largely filled the function of the primary anticommunist 
right-wing press (parallel to today’s Murdoch media) in West Germany. 
In 1960 a series of articles by an unknown Fritz Tobias appeared in Der 
Spiegel, and in 1963 were collected in a book swiftly translated into 
English entitled The Reichstag Fire, and much publicized in the United 
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States. Tobias attempted to disprove the conclusions of the London 
commission by alleging that van der Lubbe acted alone, that the Nazis 
were innocent, and that the defendants had received a fair trial. The 
greatest part of his effort was directed at showing that the materials 
before the London commission had been prepared by Communists (and 
were in some cases forged), and that the commission itself was a giant 
piece of Communist propaganda. Quoting extensively from “recanta-
tions of ex-Communists,” Tobias derided those who organized the 
commission and saw to the publication of its work, particularly the 
Brown Book. Tobias focused on Willi Muenzenberg, who was a principal 
organizer of the commission, and portrays him as scheming and unreli-
able. In his list of ex-Communists, Tobias prominently included Arthur 
Koestler, although he failed to note that Koestler’s later memoir—
written when he was very much an “ex”—credits the Brown Book with 
exposing Nazi terror and regards it as a “certainty” that Nazi circles, 
probably a group of Storm Troopers, were the authors of the fire. 
In addition to his (then effective) Cold War argument that anything 
alleged by a Communist is likely to be false, Tobias relied heavily on 
speculative—and contradictory—testimony that Hitler appeared to be 
surprised at the fire and could therefore not have been party to a plot. 
In portraying van der Lubbe as sole perpetrator, Tobias dismissed the 
forensic evidence of extensive fire damage from multiple points of ori-
gin. The testimony of the fire experts at the trial asserting the necessity 
of multiple arsonists with knowledge of the building’s layout (and even 
of Goering himself to that effect) is dismissed as “exaggerations” in-
tended to make the fire seem more serious than it was. As for the 
Gisevius account, Tobias claims that Gisevius had not been at the 
Reichstag Fire trial as observer for the Gestapo, that Ernst had an alibi 
for the time of the outbreak of the Reichstag Fire, and that Rall had 
been shown not to be a member of Ernst’s SA brigade (unfortunately for 
those who would rely upon Tobias, it was later shown that each of these 
statements was false). 
The hero for Tobias is Torgler’s appointed counsel Alfons Sack, a 
member of the National Socialist Party. After Torgler was acquitted, 
Sack’s career took a brief tumble and he was personally at some risk. 
However, he swiftly overcame any doubt as to his loyalty and in a 1935 
book announced that in criminal trials in the New Germany judges, 
public prosecutors, and defense counsel should be “comrades on the 
legal front...[and] just as the new trial no longer represents a conflict 
between the interests of an individual and the state, now the legal 
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participants should regard their tasks no longer as opposed to one 
another.” Dr. Sack’s view reached its full development in the Nazi 
“People’s Courts” where the appointed defense counsels often joined 
in accusing those they represented. Trial observers differ on whether 
Sack was an effective defense counsel. Arthur Garfield Hays, the 
American lawyer who was a member of the commission and attended 
most of the trial, thought Sack’s performance very competent. He dis-
missed the idea that Sack should have taken up the theme that the 
Nazis planned the fire. In a book written in 1934 about the trial, Sack 
derided the evidence that the Nazis had set the fire. Other observers 
of political trials point out that given the Nazi leaders decision to con-
front the Brown Book allegations with the testimony of Goebbels, 
Goering, and others, no lawyer should have remained “neutral” in the 
face of such evidence. The Nazis had laid down the political challenge 
in their approach to the trial, and it was foolhardy not to engage them 
on the field of battle they had chosen. On this view, which we share, 
Sack’s performance left much to be desired. In Tobias’s view, Sack was 
a model of what a defense counsel should be.
Tobias made much of Arthur Garfield Hays’s statement that there was 
no “direct evidence” that the Nazis set the fire. Yet this is a distortion of 
what Hays believed. Direct evidence would have been testimony by an 
eyewitness who saw the incendiaries at work. Hays left no doubt, in his 
thorough review of the evidence that strong circumstantial evidence 
pointed to Nazi guilt. Indeed, when the chief trial prosecutor, Dr. Karl 
Werner, claimed that Hays had told a Swedish newspaper that the Nazis 
were not involved, Hays fired back a letter to Werner, saying, “There is 
no direct evidence that Lubbe had accomplices but if, as you claim, he 
did not act alone, then his associates must have been Nazis.” Tobias did 
not cite this letter, but rather said—falsely—that “Hays was one of the 
few to realize that van der Lubbe had fired the Reichstag by himself.” 
Despite its harsh ideological bias and many failings, under Cold War 
circumstances the Tobias version became authoritative, at least in West 
German and U.S. establishment accounts. Certainly no graduate student 
aspiring to a career in the West German or U.S. academy would have 
dared challenge the Tobias account for an entire generation. 
With the demolition of the German Democratic Republic and the an-
nexation of East Germany into the Bundesrepublik, some of the Cold 
War ideological effort expended on the exculpation of the Nazi legal 
system lost its raison d’être, and it became possible for a new generation 
of lawyers and historians to look back more calmly upon its history. No 
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doubt it also helped that the last of the Nazi jurists would by then have 
retired from the bench and from chairs at the universities. Ingo Mueller, 
a German law professor and public official, wrote Hitler’s Justice: The Courts 
of the Third Reich, which appeared in English translation in 1991. Mueller 
ruthlessly sets out the extent to which the existing German judiciary of 
1933—excepting of course their Jewish colleagues, who quickly disap-
peared from the bench—adapted without difficulty to the Nazi regime. 
He also sets out the total failure of the “denazification” process as far as 
the West German courts were concerned, and the truth of the much 
disputed ’60s allegations that the West German judiciary was domi-
nated by those who had willingly served the Nazi regime, and in many 
cases been Nazis themselves. Mueller is undecided as to whether the 
Nazis set the Reichstag Fire, but concurs that it was in their interest to 
have done so. He notes the way in which the Nazi leadership exploited 
the situation and ridicules the presiding judge’s unfounded rejection of 
the claim of Nazi complicity. 
In A History of Public Law in Germany 1914–45, which appeared in English 
translation in 2004, Michael Stolleis completes the task of demonstrat-
ing that the professors of public law in the German universities—again 
excepting their Jewish colleagues who quickly disappeared—similarly 
worked smoothly and in many cases eagerly for the Nazi regime, and in 
almost all cases kept their positions under the West German regime.
As for the history of the Reichstag Fire itself, the decisive event was 
the 2001 publication of Der Reichstagbrand—Wie Geschichte gemacht wird (The 
Reichstag Fire—How History is Created) by historian Alexander Bahar and 
physicist and psychologist Wilfried Kugel. They reviewed official files 
that had previously been unavailable as well as those that had been the 
subject of earlier inquiry, and analyzed the forensic evidence. Their ex-
tensive discussion of the forensic evidence ends the matter; in the eleven 
to fourteen minutes that van der Lubbe had available according to the 
testimony at trial, it was impossible for him to have been to all—or even 
many of—the places where fires were set. Nor could van der Lubbe have 
carried from place to place the amount of accelerant used to set the fires. 
Henceforward anyone defending the Tobias thesis needs either reject 
the entire forensic testimony at trial or the laws of nature, or both. 
As for the mysterious revisionist “historian” Tobias himself, he was 
neither lawyer nor historian and it seems he had never completed sec-
ondary education. He asserted his ideological neutrality with a ques-
tionable claim to prior membership in the Social Democratic Party, but 
it seems that he had served in the Nazi occupation forces in the 
T h e  r e i c h S T a g  F i r e  T r i a l  4 7
Netherlands, in Italy, and in White Russia as a member of the Geheime 
Feldpolizei, the Gestapo of the Wehrmacht. And, as previously men-
tioned, his “factual” disproof of the Gisevius account of how the Nazis 
set the fire was based on a series of untruths. 
The full documentation now available includes the fact that Gisevius 
was, as he claimed, Gestapo observer at the trial. Bahar and Kugel un-
covered records that conclusively confirm the Gisevius charge that Rall 
had sought in the days before his murder to set out the facts of the use 
of the tunnels from Goering’s residence to the Reichstag, the prior visit 
of the team to the building to run through the arson, the identity of the 
leader of the detachment (Gewehr, a name that never appears in the 
Tobias account), and the personal supervision of the Berlin SA com-
mander Karl Ernst. Most of the ten members of the SA detachment that 
set the fire were murdered by the SS in the “night of the long knives”—
the so-called Roehm putsch—in June 1934. Diels, the head of the 
Gestapo in 1933 to whom Gisevius reported, said in 1946 that Gewehr 
was the only member of the unit that fired the Reichstag to have sur-
vived. The newly available evidence establishes the record of Gewehr’s 
SA service in the unit alleged to be responsible for the fire (SA-Sturm 
17), and his use of flammable agents for arson from 1931. The Bahar and 
Kugel book appears to be the definitive word on the Reichstag Fire.
conclusion
For us, the exemplary role played by the two lawyers of the Anglo-
American legal tradition in the London commission has stood the test 
of time. Despite the accusation against the London commission of 
“Communist propaganda” from the Nazis in the ’30s and Tobias in the 
’60s, D. N. Pritt, K.C., and Arthur Garfield Hays would be acknowl-
edged today in the legal community as among the leading U.S. and U.K. 
lawyers of the first half of the twentieth century. Nor today should 
there be any dispute as to the complicity of the entire community of 
German jurists (law teachers and judges)—excepting always their dis-
appeared Jewish colleagues—in the horrors of the Nazi debacle. Today, 
facing a new regime of preventive detention and emergency “Patriot 
Act” abolition of fundamental rights, it is important not to think that 
“the Law” as such offers protection. We must offer such support as we 
can to those lawyers and jurists whose politics and decency have made 
them take a stand against our own emerging police state regimes. 
In January 2008, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany finally over-
turned the death penalty verdict on Marinus van der Lubbe, clearly 
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incapable in his damaged state of defending himself at trial, as politi-
cally motivated and unjust. However welcome this recognition of fun-
damental fact, we must end by noting that the tenth of January 2009 
marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of Marinus van der Lubbe’s execu-
tion by beheading in a Leipzig prison yard, three days before his twen-
ty-fifth birthday.
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